IoT Botnets: Could Your Toaster Attack a Website?

I used to laugh at the idea that a fridge or a toaster could be dangerous. It sounded like a bad sci‑fi plot mixed with a Black Friday ad.

Then I watched a client’s website vanish under a wave of traffic coming from thousands of cameras, routers, and random “smart” gadgets, and I stopped laughing very quickly.

The short answer: yes, your toaster really could attack a website, at least in theory. Any internet‑connected device with weak security can be hijacked and folded into an IoT botnet. Most attacks use things like cameras, routers, and DVRs, but the line between “harmless gadget” and “attack node” is thinner than most people think. If it runs a tiny operating system, has an open port, and talks to the internet, it can probably be abused by the wrong person.

What is an IoT botnet, really?

When people hear “botnet,” they usually think of infected laptops in a hacker movie. That still happens, but a lot of the muscle now comes from IoT devices.

An IoT botnet is:

A collection of internet‑connected devices (cameras, routers, TVs, smart speakers, etc.) that have been compromised by malware and are remotely controlled as a single army, usually to attack targets or send spam.

Once a device is infected, it usually:

1. Waits for commands from a control server.
2. Joins coordinated attacks, often without any change visible to the owner.
3. Keeps trying to infect other devices using simple tricks.

The key point: the owner of the device typically has no idea. The device keeps doing its normal job. The camera still shows video. The toaster still heats bread. That is what makes it so effective.

Why IoT devices are such easy targets

IoT gadgets are often soft targets compared with laptops or phones. Some common reasons:

• Weak or default passwords.
• Outdated firmware that never gets patched.
• Cheap hardware with minimal security features.
• Vendors rushing products to market with “good enough” protections.

A lot of people plug these devices in, connect them once, and forget about them. No updates. No password changes. No network segmentation. From an attacker’s point of view, this is perfect.

Attackers love anything that is “set and forget” because long‑lived devices become long‑lived resources.

Now let us tie this directly to the toaster question.

Could a toaster really join a botnet?

If your “toaster” is literally just a heating element and a timer, then no. There is no code to infect. No operating system. No networking stack. Nothing for malware to live on.

But we do not live in that simple world anymore. Today you can buy a “smart” toaster that:

• Connects to Wi‑Fi.
• Has a mobile app.
• Syncs with voice assistants.
• Receives firmware updates.

Once those features exist, the game changes.

The moment your toaster runs code and talks to the internet, it is not just a toaster anymore. It is a tiny computer with heating elements.

Can such a device:

– Have bugs?
– Ship with default credentials?
– Use old versions of libraries that have known exploits?

Yes, yes, and yes.

So in principle, a smart toaster can be infected and used:

– To send traffic in a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
– To scan your local network for more devices to infect.
– To act as a proxy to hide the attacker’s real location.
– To host small malicious payloads or configuration files.

Do criminals actively target smart toasters right now at scale? That is less clear. They usually go for easy, high‑volume categories like:

• IP cameras.
• Home routers.
• DVRs and NVRs.
• Smart TVs and media boxes.

But as more “weird” devices connect to Wi‑Fi (toasters, kettles, coffee machines, toys), some of them inevitably end up dragged into these nets as well. Criminals do not care what the device controls. They care that it can send packets.

How IoT botnets form: the (simplified) attack chain

Let us walk through how these networks form. This is not just theory; variations of this happened with botnets like Mirai and its descendants.

1. Scanning the internet for weak devices

Attackers rarely hand‑pick individual machines. They write code that:

• Scans huge IP ranges for open ports (like 23 for Telnet or 80/8080 for web interfaces).
• Probes each IP to see if there is a known IoT device present.
• Checks for telltale signatures in banners, titles, or responses.

Some even abuse open search engines like Shodan or Censys to skip part of that process and jump directly to vulnerable targets.

2. Brute forcing or abusing default credentials

Once they find a device, they try simple credential tricks:

• Default username and password combos like “admin/admin” or “root/123456”.
• Short, common passwords from a small dictionary.
• Known backdoor accounts left by some vendors.

Mirai famously used a small list of common username/password pairs and still managed to rope in hundreds of thousands of devices.

Huge parts of the problem come from people never changing the factory password or reusing the same weak one everywhere.

3. Dropping the malware

Once the attacker gets in, the next steps usually look like this:

1. Download a small binary for the device’s CPU type (ARM, MIPS, etc.).
2. Execute it.
3. Have the binary connect back to a command‑and‑control (C2) server.

This malware does not usually need to be very large. It just needs to:

– Maintain a connection with the C2.
– Listen for attack commands.
– Possibly scan for more devices to infect.

Many IoT devices have tiny amounts of memory and storage. Attackers adapt to that reality.

4. Growing and maintaining the botnet

Over time, the botnet:

• Expands as each infected device tries to infect others.
• Sheds devices that drop offline or get rebooted or patched.
• Shifts infrastructure when defenders take down C2 servers.

Attackers sometimes release new variants that:

– Add more credential combos.
– Target different device brands.
– Include simple evasion tactics.

Think of it less as a fixed “thing” and more as a constantly changing colony of devices.

5. Launching attacks on websites

Once an attacker controls thousands or millions of devices, they can point them at almost any target.

Common attacks include:

• HTTP floods: Botnet devices send huge numbers of HTTP requests to a site to overwhelm servers.
• TCP/UDP floods: Devices send raw network packets to saturate bandwidth or exhaust resources on routers and firewalls.
• Application‑layer attacks: Requests that look normal but are crafted to trigger heavy operations on the server.

This is what can knock high‑traffic websites offline for hours. Your toaster by itself does not do much. Ten thousand “toasters” and cameras at once do a lot.

Real‑world examples: what has already happened

I remember when Mirai hit the news; a lot of security people had mixed feelings. It was scary, but it also forced vendors and consumers to pay attention.

Here are some cases that give context.

Botnet	Target devices	Impact
Mirai	Cameras, routers, DVRs	Massive DDoS on DNS provider Dyn; affected major websites.
Mozi	Home routers, IoT devices	Large peer‑to‑peer botnet used for DDoS and traffic hijacking.
Hajime	IoT devices (similar to Mirai targets)	Big botnet with more complex architecture; harder to neutralize.

None of these focused on “smart toasters” because there were many easier, more common devices. But the pattern holds:

If a device is internet‑connected, poorly secured, and widely deployed, it is a candidate for the next wave of IoT botnets.

We already have:

– Smart plugs.
– Smart bulbs.
– Smart locks.
– Smart ovens and microwaves.
– Smart kettles and coffee machines.

So the category that your toaster belongs to is already in play.

Why criminals like IoT botnets so much

There is a reason attackers are leaning into IoT instead of focusing only on PCs.

1. Volume and scale are easy

There are billions of IoT devices. Many:

– Stay online 24/7.
– Sit in homes and small offices with little monitoring.
– Are never patched after installation.

For attackers, that is a gigantic pool of potential bots.

2. Low risk of detection by owners

If someone infects your laptop, you might notice:

– It is slow.
– The fan is loud.
– Pop‑ups appear.

If someone infects your toaster, what do you notice?

Maybe nothing. The device might:

– Send short bursts of traffic now and then.
– Run a tiny process in the background.
– Use such a small slice of CPU that it does not affect performance.

Most people are not logging inbound/outbound traffic from their toaster, or from their smart TV.

3. Diversity of hardware and software

IoT devices use:

– Many different CPU architectures.
– Vendor‑specific management panels.
– Custom or stripped‑down operating systems.

This variation makes broad defense harder. A single security tool cannot just “cover everything” easily.

From a defender’s point of view, that is frustrating. From an attacker’s point of view, that is helpful.

4. They are cheap to attack

Attackers can:

• Scan the internet cheaply using rented servers.
• Reuse old malware code and slightly modify it.
• Sell access to botnets as a service to others.

There is a business model behind this. Individuals and even small groups can rent a botnet and attack a website without building the network themselves.

DDoS‑for‑hire services exist because there is an oversupply of insecure devices quietly waiting to be abused.

How this affects website owners and developers

If you run or manage websites, the root of the attack might be someone else’s toaster, but the impact lands on you.

1. DDoS risk and downtime

The most obvious effect is downtime.

Effects of a serious IoT botnet DDoS:

• Web servers become unresponsive or slow.
• APIs start timing out or throwing errors.
• Users lose trust if outages repeat.
• Operations and support costs go up.

A lot of site owners underestimate how little traffic it sometimes takes to overwhelm parts of their stack, especially if it is not tuned for hostile patterns.

2. Higher infrastructure and security costs

To deal with the possible flood of traffic, you might need to:

• Add protection services (CDN, WAF, DDoS mitigation providers).
• Upgrade network capacity or server instances.
• Pay for better logging, monitoring, and alerting.

These are good investments, but they do count as overhead triggered by a problem that you did not cause directly.

3. SEO and user trust

Frequent downtime and slow responses can:

• Increase bounce rates.
• Hurt search visibility over time.
• Damage your reputation with customers who see “site not available” when they need it.

I have seen brands spend years building trust, then lose a lot of goodwill with a single high‑profile outage and poor communication.

How to reduce the chance that your own devices join a botnet

Let us switch sides for a moment. Forget about protecting your website. How do you stop your toaster or camera from being part of the problem?

1. Change default passwords on every device

This sounds basic. It is. It still does not happen often enough.

Steps:

1. When you set up a device, log in to its admin page or app.
2. Change the default username if possible.
3. Set a long, unique password. A password manager really helps here.

If your router or camera still has “admin / admin” or “admin / password” on it, that is like leaving your front door wide open.

Try to avoid:

– Short passwords.
– Reusing passwords from other services.
– Simple patterns like “12345678” or your birthday.

2. Keep firmware up to date

Firmware is the low‑level software that runs the device. Vendors sometimes release updates to fix known security problems.

Good habits:

• Log in to each device’s admin panel every so often to check for updates.
• Enable automatic updates when the option exists.
• Replace devices from vendors that never publish updates.

I know this is boring. It feels like a chore with no visible reward. But the alternative is that attackers keep exploiting old bugs for years.

3. Segment your home or office network

This is where you can start to think more like an IT admin, even at home.

Helpful patterns:

• Create a separate Wi‑Fi network for IoT devices (often called a guest network).
• Do not give IoT gadgets direct access to sensitive computers or servers.
• Use VLANs or separate SSIDs if your router supports them.

This does not stop a device from joining a botnet, but it does:

– Limit what an attacker can see or reach if they compromise a gadget.
– Reduce the risk that one infected device helps infect others on your main network.

4. Disable unnecessary features

Many devices ship with:

– Remote access enabled by default.
– Unused services running in the background.
– Open ports that are not needed.

You can improve safety slightly by:

• Turning off remote access features that you never use.
• Blocking external access to admin interfaces from the internet.
• Checking your router’s port forwarding rules and removing unknown ones.

If your toaster has a “remote control from outside home” toggle that you never touch, there is no reason to leave it on.

5. Buy from vendors with visible security practices

Not every brand treats security equally. Over time, patterns appear.

Positive signs:

• The vendor publishes security advisories on their site.
• The device has a clear way to update firmware.
• The product does not force you to use a fixed default password.

Negative signs:

• No firmware update story at all.
• Old models with known vulnerabilities that were never fixed.
• Products marketed only on convenience and price with zero mention of security.

You do not need to become a security researcher. But a quick search like “brand + security vulnerability” before buying can tell you a lot.

How website owners and teams can defend against IoT botnet attacks

Now let us go back to the website side. You cannot patch random toasters across the globe, but you can harden what you control.

1. Use layered protection: CDN, WAF, and rate limits

Strong defenses usually combine several pieces:

• Content delivery network (CDN): Spreads traffic across many edge locations and soaks up part of the load.
• Web application firewall (WAF): Filters and blocks malicious patterns at the HTTP layer.
• Rate limiting: Restricts how many requests a single IP or client can send in a period.

This will not eliminate all risk, but it can reduce the chance that a sudden wave of IoT traffic takes you down.

2. Tune your infrastructure for hostile traffic

Sometimes the problem is not that the volume is huge; it is that your system handles each request in an expensive way.

Ways to reduce load per request:

• Add caching for pages or API responses that do not change often.
• Avoid heavy database queries for simple actions.
• Use connection timeouts and sane limits.
• Offload static assets (images, CSS, JS) to a CDN.

I have seen sites fall over from what should have been a manageable increase in traffic because every page view triggered multiple unindexed queries.

3. Monitor traffic patterns continuously

You cannot respond to what you do not see.

At minimum:

• Track normal baseline traffic levels: requests per second, types of requests, geographic spread.
• Set alerts for unusual spikes or patterns.
• Log enough data to analyze an incident after the fact.

Over time, you can learn to spot:

– Short, sharp spikes that look like test runs.
– Slow, steady increases designed to evade quick detection.
– Attacks that target specific endpoints or parameters.

The earlier you spot an attack building, the more options you have to respond without a panic.

4. Have a playbook for DDoS events

I have seen teams lose precious time in the first 30 minutes of an attack because nobody was quite sure who should do what.

A basic playbook might include:

• Who is responsible for technical response.
• Who talks to customers or the public if needed.
• What knobs you can turn quickly (rate limits, blocking whole regions, switching traffic through a scrubbing provider).
• How to contact your hosting provider or security vendors during an incident.

You do not need a 100‑page manual, but some written plan is better than “we will figure it out live.”

5. Test under load

Many websites never see heavy traffic until an attack or a sudden spike of interest. By then, it is too late to discover bottlenecks.

Helpful practices:

• Run controlled load tests against non‑production environments.
• Check where your system fails first: CPU, memory, database, network, application limits.
• Fix the weakest links before you are on the front page of a news site or under attack.

You cannot perfectly simulate a malicious IoT botnet, but you can at least understand how your stack handles stress.

Why the “smart everything” trend keeps this problem alive

This is the part where I sometimes catch myself sounding a bit cynical.

We keep adding connectivity to objects that never needed it. Some of it is useful. Remote control of thermostats can save energy. Smart locks can add convenience in offices.

But some of it feels like:

– Marketing checklists.
– Data collection opportunities.
– Vendor lock‑in.

From a security angle, every extra internet‑connected toaster or kettle is:

– Another potential node in an attack.
– Another device that might never see updates.
– Another product designed with tight margins that tempt shortcuts.

The IoT boom solved some problems and created a quiet army of under‑secured devices at the same time.

I am not saying “do not buy any smart device.” That is not realistic. But I am saying: treat anything that connects to the internet as a computer, not as an appliance, even if it looks like an appliance.

Because to an attacker, your toaster is a small Linux box with a heating feature.

Not the other way around.

Quick checklist: is your toaster likely to be part of a botnet?

Let me make this a bit more practical. This applies to any smart appliance, but we will keep using the toaster image.

• Does it connect directly to your Wi‑Fi network?
• Does it have a web dashboard or mobile app with remote control?
• Did you log in and change the default password?
• Can you see firmware update options in its settings?
• Is it on the same network as your laptops, phones, NAS, or work machines?

If your answers look like:

– “Yes, yes, no, not sure, yes.”

Then:

1. Change the password today.
2. Check for updates.
3. Move it to a guest network if you can.

No, this will not solve the IoT botnet problem worldwide. But it makes your corner of the internet slightly less attractive to the people trying to turn every cheap gadget into a weapon.

And if you also run a website, do not shrug off DDoS risk just because you are not “big.” Many attacks are automated or opportunistic. If a teenager with access to a rented botnet can knock you offline for fun or for a small fee, some of them will.

So yes, your toaster could attack a website one day. The better question is: what are you doing so that it does not? And what are you doing so that, if someone else’s toaster joins the next botnet, your site still stays up?